Tribocracy: The New Political Philosophy for the New Country (Part 2)

For the Republic of South Sudan to avoid the pitfalls of her fellow African countries and be politically and socio-economically successful, she must fully embrace and constitutionally legalize tribalism as a system of political representation in the constitution of government at the local, state, and regional government and especially in the national governments based in Juba.

By PaanLuel Wel, Washington DC, USA

August 4, 2011 (SSNA) — Though South Sudanese are yet to know and witness the final shape and form of the forthcoming new cabinet, it is now official that the full composition of the post-independence South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), or the bicameral National Legislative Assembly (NLA) as it has been re-christened, has been identified, constituted and decreed by President Salva Kiir Mayaardit. According to the Presidential Decree No.10/2011 for the Transformation and Reconstitution of the National Legislative Assembly of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, the fully-fledged SSLA is now composed of an astronomical number of not less than 382 honorable members of the bicameral house.

Of these, 170 are the old 2010 elected members; 96 members are the political refugees displaced from the Government of National Unity in Khartoum, April 2011, in the wake of South Sudan successful secession, 50 members are the South Sudanese members of the Council of States from Khartoum, and the remaining 66 members are the Benydit Kiir political cronyists, who, I suppose, had to be politically accommodated to deny the devil the opportunity to use them to destabilize the country. It appear Benydit Kiir and Kuormedit Machar are rationalizing that their government, hence their coveted positions, would be politically secured if only they could take care of these small fish. And what is the better way to make an ally, even for a day, out of potential political rivals than bringing him/her to your side where he/she could indulge in the warmth of the wealth-generating fire around Benydit?

That as it may be, there is one burning question that South Sudanese are dying to know: is the newly-decreed South Sudan Legislative Assembly constituted tribocratically? That is to say, is it a regionally-balanced political appointment and a tribally-fair and -transparent political representation according to the respective population sizes of those parameters? Whether the finding to that query is in the affirmative or not would, indubitably, be a harbinger to the composition of the looming cabinet.

In this second part of “Tribocracy: The New Political Philosophy for the New Country,” I am going to tribocratically dissect and analyze the just announced South Sudan Legislative Assembly at the regional level. Secondly, I am going to propose the regional composition, based on the principle of tribocracy, of the yet-to be revealed Cabinet of the Republic of South Sudan. I have widely and exhaustively discussed the meaning and the indispensableness of tribocracy as the new proposed political philosophy of governance in the new Republic South Sudan in part one of “Tribocracy: The New Political Philosophy for the New Country.”

It therefore suffice, here, to briefly state that whereas tribalism is “a form of government where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts disproportionately large to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group(s) represents and use them to advance the position of their particular ethnic group(s) to the detriment of others;” tribocracy, the opposite twin sister and her true panacea, on the other hand, is a political system, to paraphrase the same quote, where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts proportionate to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group(s) represents in order to promote and achieve fair and equitable political representation across all ethnic groups that comprise and form that particular nation.

Tribocracy at the Regional Level

According to the record of the South Sudan Census Commissioner, Hon. Isaiah Chol Aruai, the current population of the Republic of South Sudan, based on the May 2009 Sudan fifth population and housing census, stand at approximately 8.26 millions. At the states level, Jonglei state has about 1.36 million; Central Equatoria state about 1.10 million; Warrap state about 0.97 millions; Upper Nile about 0.96 million; Eastern Eqatoria state about 0.91 millions; Northern Bahr el Ghazal about 0.72 millions; Lakes state about 0.695 million; Western Equatoria state about 0.62 millions; Unity state about 0.585 millions and Western Bahr el Ghazal with about 0.33 million.

Regionally speaking, therefore, Greater Upper Nile region—comprising three states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile—would have about 2.91 million people. Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, which is made up of four states of Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, would score around 2.72 million people. Finally, Greater Equatoria region, composed of three states of Central Equatoria, Eastern Eqatoria and Western Equatoria, would get about 2.63 million inhabitants.

Thus, from the total population of 8.26 million citizens of the Republic of South Sudan, 35% of them reside in Greater Upper Nile region, 33% in Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, while 32% live in Greater Equatoria region. Tribocratically speaking, that mean that in term of an equitable and fair political representation in the national government in Juba, Greater Upper Nile region should get 35% share of the seats in Juba, and Greater Bahr el Ghazal should take home 33% share of the seats while Greater Equatoria region should pocket the remaining percentage of 32%.

That political arrangement would, of course, be applicable to, and implementable at, both the composition of the South Sudan National Assembly as well as the forthcoming cabinet appointment. Tell me, which region would have the audacity to complain of political marginalization; discriminative under-representation; disproportionate underdevelopment, political neglect and/or tribalism in political appointments were that to be the legal political framework under which President Salva Kiir decrees and political appointments are informed and based on?

Now let’s go back to the burning question we just broached before at the beginning of this article that South Sudanese can’t wait to find out: is the current SSLA/NLA composition tribocratically informed? I mean, based on the three Greater regions we have in respective to their populations we just saw not-long ago, is the current decreed Assembly regionally balanced? Are all regions politically represented in the national assembly proportionally to their population?

To ascertain whether or not there is tribocratic representation in the newly decreed national assembly, we must analyze the list itself in terms of the names and the regions they originate from. Based on the Presidential Decree No.10/2011 for the Transformation and Reconstitution of the National Legislative Assembly of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, there are about 92 members from Greater Upper Nile region, approximately 88 members from Greater Bahr el Ghazal region and close to 86 members from Greater Equatoria region (with generous allowance, of course, for a possible statistical error due to my own human error in arithmetic.) This calculation does not include the new 66 presidential appointees or the 50 South Sudanese members of the Council of States from Khartoum. The states of origin for the last two groups are not provided in the list of the presidential decree. Hence it is a daunting task to classify them regionally.

In percentage proportionality, these figures, miraculously or by design, translate into about 35% for Greater Upper Nile region, 33% for Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, and 32% for Greater Equatoria region. Correspondingly, in term of population size, Greater Upper Nile region lead with 35%, follow by Greater Bahr el Ghazal region with 33% and then lastly Greater Equatoria region with 32% of the total population. Therefore, it is fairly accurate to inferentially conclude that there is fair and equitable representation of seats base on the proportional strength of each Greater region according to their respective population. And since this article is about tribocracry on regional level only, I will not delve into the state level here, at least for now.

The People Cabinet

By sheer coincidence or by meticulous regional balancing act by the president, we have seen that the recently decreed SSLA/NLA somehow met and satisfied the principle of tribocratic system; at least for those figures we have analyzed. There is a discernable political equality in the sharing of the political seats in the South Sudan Legislative Assembly across the three regions, namely, Greater Upper Nile, Greater Bahr el Ghazal and the Greater Equatoria region. Therefore, as far as the post-independence SSLA is concerned, tribocracy has been effected and no region would begrudge the president on the ground of political discrimination.

If we apply the same tribocratic principle on the formation of the pending cabinet, how would it look like? Which ministries would go to which region and why? In the determination of how many and which ministries would be given to which region, we must, in addition to tribocratic model, acknowledge that not all ministries carry equal weights. This is because some ministries, Finance or defence for instance, are more valuable and highly-sought after than, say ministry of gender or forestry.

Thus, two factors that would guide us in the allocation of ministries to the three regions are the weights attached to each of the ministries under consideration and the proportional share of each region in the national government based on its population. Consequently, the next cabinet, if it were to be appointed on the basis of tribocracy, would have 35% of the seats going to the Greater Upper Nile region of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States. The four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal region—Warrap, Lakes, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal—would take 33% share of the cabinet seats while Greater Equatoria—comprising of Central, Western and Eastern Equatoria states—would bag 32% share of the cabinet portfolios.

Considering that President Kiir has promised South Sudanese a lean and broad-based cabinet this time round, say 22-25 members instead of the current 32 members, how will it look like if it were predestined on and by the principle of tribocracy? Tribocratically appointed, the final numbers that would make up the new cabinet won’t matter as much as the fact that 35% of the seats should be allocate to Greater Upper Nile region, 33% to Greater Bahr el Ghazal region and 32% to Greater Equatoria region. Secondly, the most plum ministerial posts—Legal affairs, Defense, finance, presidency, vice presidency, Interior or internal affairs ministry, foreign affairs, Speaker post, (SPLM SG post) etc.—must all be share equally among the three Greater regions of the Republic of South Sudan.

So what is the final outcome of the deliberation? Below are the tribocratically proposed list of the new cabinet of the Republic of South Sudan according to the wills and wishes of the majority of its citizen:

The Tribocratic Proposed list of the New Cabinet of the Republic of South Sudan according to the wills and wishes of the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan

1. The Tentative Cabinet of the Republic of South Sudan

S/N	Ministry	Region
1	Office of the President	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
2	Office of the Vice President	Greater Upper Nile
3	The Speaker of the National Legislative Assembly	Greater Equatoria
4	SPLM Secretary General Office	Greater Upper Nile
5	Cabinet Affairs	Greater Equatoria
6	Ministry of Defense/SPLA and Veteran Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
7	Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development	Greater Upper Nile
8	Foreign Affairs/Regional Co-operation	Greater Equatoria
9	Interior/Internal Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
10	Labor and Public Services	Greater Upper Nile
11	Parliamentary Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
12	Finance and Economic Planning	Greater Equatoria
13	Road and Transport	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
14	Agriculture and Forestry	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
15	Animal Resource and Fisheries	Greater Upper Nile
16	Co-operative and Rural Development	Greater Upper Nile
17	Energy and Mining/Oil	Greater Upper Nile
18	Commerce and Industry	Greater Upper Nile
19	Wildlife Conservation and Tourism	Greater Upper Nile
20	Irrigation and Water Resources	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
21	Housing and Physical Planning	Greater Equatoria
22	Education	Greater Equatoria
23	Health	Greater Equatoria
24	Information	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
25	Communication and Postal Services	Greater Upper Nile
26	Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs	Greater Equatoria
27	Culture and Heritage	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
28	Investment	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
29	Human Resource and Development	Greater Equatoria
30	Environment	Greater Equatoria
31	Higher Education, Science and Technology	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
32	Youth, Sport and Recreation	Greater Upper Nile
33	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	Greater Equatoria
34	Peace and CPA Implementation Affairs	Greater Upper Nile

How the People Cabinet was Arrived at.

I have been patient enough waiting for President Kiir to make public his new cabinet line-up before I could propose mine. But since he is dragging his feet and taking too long to make known the new composition of the cabinet, I have taken the liberty, gone ahead and proposed mine, guided by the spirit of tribocracy at the regional level. Above, as it is below here too, is my proposed shape and form of the cabinet that president Kiir would unveil soon in Juba, maybe this week. For the sake of convenience and familiarity, I have stuck to the original 34 membership as the total number of cabinet portfolios which would, of course, be revised when the exact number is revealed.

I have, as you have surely recognized, included some relevant positions which are not really part of the cabinet portfolio but are still nevertheless relevant in the balancing act of all important political positions in the country. This is so as to give a clear picture of why and how which region got what ministry and not the other one and vice-versa.

Given that we are basing our arithmetic on the proposed 34 positions to be shared out among the three Greater regions each according to its share of the country total population, we are going to end up with the following outcomes: Greater Upper Nile, the most populous region in the country, will scoop 12 ministries (35% x 34 = 11.9); Greater Bahr el Ghazal will get 11 ministries of the total 34 ministries (33% x 34 = 11.22) and Greater Equatoria region will secured itself about 11 ministries too (32% x 34 = 11.88).

As for which particular ministry should or must go to which region, all I can say is that that is the trickiest part as I found out the hard way when I assembled my small think tank of three people, each representing one of the three regions. The rule of the game was that four positions—presidency, vice presidency, speaker of the national legislative assembly and the SPLM SG post—are all predetermined and therefore should be left that way. The second rule was that Greater Equatoria region must be given the first two choices to pick any two ministries of their choice in order to compensate for the loss of the presidency and the vice presidency which are already legally assigned.

The third rule was that each region thereafter must pick one ministry when it turn comes and any ministry that has already been taken is non-negotiation; that is, it can’t be claimed by anyone else picking afterward for you can only choose from the pools of ministries that are still up for grabs on the table. The fourth rule was that some ministries that have more relevancies to particular regions must be assigned to those regions. Energy and mining, for example, should be given to Greater Upper Nile region since the oil is mined in Unity state or any ministry that deals with land issues such as the Housing and Physical Planning ministry should be allocated to Greater Equatoria region since land around Juba has been part of our national headache and would be better handle by someone from that area to assuage the fear of land grabbing.

And since Greater Bahr el Ghazal was assumed to have made the first choice in the presidency and the Greater Upper Nile in the vice presidency, it was the turn of the Greater Equatoria region to pick the first two ministries of their choices before the next chance would fall on Greater Bahr el Ghazal and so forth and so on till each region attain her mandatory quota of the cabinet positions as calculated above. But no sooner did we start the process than it abruptly ground into a halt, just a few minutes after we commenced the deliberation. Though each of the representatives was given an opportunity to make his best choice given what was on the table, it seem each and every representative was never satisfied with one chance at a time.

For example, a representative from Greater Upper Nile or Greater Equatoria would pick, say, ministry X, while at the same time demanding that none of the next two guys should touch ministry Y and Z because, he assumed, those ministries should belong to them too, in total disregard to rule number three above. As the process got halfway, the representatives actually began threatening to walk out from the process itself claiming unfairness and political coercion if not given certain ministries which they had failed to pick when it was their turn and which are now already chosen.

As I found myself between the rock and the hard wall, I began to realize why President Salva Kiir is yet to announce his cabinet. I started appreciating the political dilemma he is up to in real life given how I got myself entangled into this mess by just mere hypothetically cabinet line-ups. In fact, my assembled think-tank broke up in disarray and I had to arbitrarily assigned some of the ministries that they could not agree on since they failed to arrive at a compromised formula over who should take which and why.

Though I pride myself on being a confirmed liberal democrat—of course one that is modified and Africanized into tribocracy—I could not help myself longing for some kind of special powers to tame and calm the rowdy team. Little wonder that authoritarianism is such a prized system of governance in the People Republic of China. It get things done at the quickest and the most efficient way available without inviting in the unnecessary debate which is done, sometimes, for the sake of itself, just to make oneself present known and to comfort oneself ego.

To recoup the main point and make things much more easier and in deeper perspective for you, below are the tribocratically proposed list of the new cabinet of the Republic of South Sudan with each ministry placed according to the region it is allocated to:

1. Greater Upper Nile Region

s/n	Ministries Allocated to the Greater Upper Nile Region	Region
1	Office of the Vice President	Greater Upper Nile Region
2	SPLM Secretary General Office	Greater Upper Nile Region
3	Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development	Greater Upper Nile Region
4	Energy and Mining/Oil	Greater Upper Nile Region
5	Animal Resource and Fisheries	Greater Upper Nile Region
6	Co-operative and Rural Development	Greater Upper Nile Region
7	Wildlife Conservation and Tourism	Greater Upper Nile Region
8	Labor and Public Services	Greater Upper Nile Region
9	Communication and Postal Services	Greater Upper Nile Region
10	Commerce and Industry	Greater Upper Nile Region
11	Youth, Sport and Recreation	Greater Upper Nile Region
12	Peace and CPA Implementation Affairs	Greater Upper Nile Region

2. Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region

s/n	Ministries Allocated to the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region	Region
1	Office of the President	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
2	Ministry of Defense/SPLA Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
3	Interior/Internal Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
4	Information	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
5	Agriculture and Forestry	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
6	Parliamentary Affairs	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
7	Irrigation and Water Resources	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
8	Higher Education, Science and Technology	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
9	Road and Transport	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
10	Investment	Greater Bahr el Ghazal
11	Culture and Heritage	Greater Bahr el Ghazal

3. Greater Equatoria Region

s/n	Ministries Allocated to the Greater Equatoria Region	Region
1	The Speaker of the National Legislative Assembly	Greater Equatoria Region
2	Finance and Economic Planning	Greater Equatoria Region
3	Foreign Affairs/Regional Co-operation	Greater Equatoria Region
4	Human Resource and Development	Greater Equatoria Region
5	Cabinet Affairs	Greater Equatoria Region
6	Environment	Greater Equatoria Region
7	Education	Greater Equatoria Region
8	Housing and Physical Planning	Greater Equatoria Region
9	Health	Greater Equatoria Region
10	Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs	Greater Equatoria Region
11	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	Greater Equatoria Region

As you can infer from the list, the fact that the cabinet could be a lean and broad-based one does not matter here because the ratio of political representation would still hold at all levels and in all numbers. For instance, should the President, who has already decreed a bicameral house of a humongous 382 members, decide to respect his words and unveil a cabinet of only 22 members as highly speculated, we can just readjust and recalculate that the three greater regions would each have the following portfolios: Greater Upper Nile 8 positions, Greater Bahr el Ghazal 7 positions, and Greater Equatoria 7 positions.

The issue of partisan inclusiveness and broad-basedness would get addressed at the regional level and is therefore not an issue at all. It is rather more of a political consideration than being a tribalistic or a political marginalization. After all, democracy has no room for political accommodation of the political losers. It is a winner-take-all scenario.

I am hesitant to name names for the ministries mentioned above because what matter is equality in political representation at the regional level, not who exactly is holding the office. If there were to be one ministry to be allocated to the Collo people, to take as an example, whether it is Hon. Pagan Amum or Dr. Lam Akol that take the office is not a problem to the Collo people so long as one of their own is in charge.

As we debate and digest the above proposed list of the forthcoming South Sudan Cabinet, let’s wait and see what Benydit Salva Kiir Mayaardit has in store for us, South Sudanese. Meanwhile, get content in the distraction the above list may present to you and your pre-conceived notion of whatever you want to see come that long awaited Cabinet.

You can reach PaanLuel Wël at [email protected] (email address), PaanLuel Wel (Facebook page), PaanLuelWel2011 (Twitter account) or through his blog account at: http://paanluelwel2011.wordpress.com//